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If being employed is not only a source of earning income to satisfy materialistic 
needs, but also the principal means of community involvement, then employment 
provides socio-psychological (or non-pecuniary) benefits as well. However, the standard 
theory of individual labor supply focuses on an individualistic notion of work and 
abstracts from the non-pecuniary benefits. It considers work as a source of disutility, and 
any time off work (leisure) as source of utility, assuming that utility always decreases 
with hours worked.
1 Standard labor-leisure choice theory asks how an individual makes 
the trade between the consumption made possible by work and leisure, or time not 
allocated to work, but ignores the socio-psychological effects of employment.  This 
shortcoming of the standard theory, which treats labor time merely as a means of earning 
income, is lucidly expressed by Krugman (1998, P.15): “Economics textbooks may treat 
the exchange of labor for money as a transaction much like the sale of a bushel of apples, 
but we all know that in human terms there is a huge difference. A merchant may sell 
many things, but a worker usually has only one job, which supplies not only his 
livelihood but often much of his sense of identity. An unsold commodity is a nuisance, an 
unemployed worker a tragedy”.  This raises a basic question: How is the individual labor 
supply decision affected by the non-pecuniary effects of work? 
In this short paper, we go beyond the standard neoclassical income-leisure choice, 
where the value of leisure is the cost of income foregone, and follow sociologists and 
psychologists (see, for example, Whelan (1994) and Agerbo et al (1997)), who recognize 
that, in addition to being a source of income and material satisfaction, employment can 
provide non-materialistic individual satisfactions. We extend the standard economic 
analysis by incorporating the positive non-pecuniary effects of employment on individual 
well-being. As an important extension of labor-leisure choice, we show that labor supply 
can be a source of utility at very low income levels, thus inducing individuals to supply 
labor as much as feasible. 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Deaton and Muellbauer (1980, Ch. 4 and 11) and Varian (1984, Ch. 6) for a 
standard treatment of labor supply in household utility function. 
 
  1 The next section briefly discusses the non-pecuniary value of employment to 
individuals. Section 3 incorporates this additional value of employment in the standard 
utilitarian model of individual income-leisure choice. Section 4 presents concluding 
remarks.   
 
2 Non-pecuniary Value of Employment  
Employment is a means for people to connect and become involved with 
communal activities. In turn, community involvement directly or indirectly brings the 
individual a sense of belonging, self-worth and respect, identity, recognition, reputation, 
and status, all of which are ingredients of one’s quality of life and satisfaction.
2 Being 
employed is an essential determinant of happiness; the unemployed have significantly 
lower well-being scores in the social psychological literature (see, for example, Fryer and 
Payne (1986), Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998), Feather (1990), and Argyle (2001)). 
Further, Lucas, et al (2004), find strong statistical evidence that the adverse effect of 
unemployment on individuals’ subjective well-being persists even after they become 
reemployed. More interestingly, empirical work in labor economics literature has 
established that unemployment is strongly negatively correlated with individual well-
being, even after controlling for income and other individual characteristics. In other 
words, the unemployed are generally worse off than the employed, and by more than 
their lower income would predict (see, for example, Clark and Oswald (1994) and Clark 
(2003) and the references cited therein).  Additionally, the fact that even in advanced 
industrial countries, where social safety nets cushion joblessness, some individuals prefer 
to be employed with earnings less than the unemployment benefit reveals the existence of 
non-pecuniary value of employment.





                                                 
2 For a general and insightful treatment of the effects of identity on economic behavior and 
outcomes, see Akerlof (2000).  
3  Moffitt (1983) finds strong empirical support for the existence of welfare stigma among eligible but 
non-participants in AFDC-U, the welfare program for which families with an unemployed male were 
eligible.    
  23 Extended Model of Labor Supply  
Let   be the individual utility function, where   is consumption, 
 is leisure time, and   captures the non-pecuniary effects (NPE) of 
employment. We assume that one’s involvement with the community, and hence the 
NPE, increases with the labor time   (i.e.
(,, ) UU c z m = 0 c ≥
0 z ≥ 0 m≥
0 ≥ A () 0 m′ > A ).
4 We make the usual 
assumptions that the utility function is increasing in each of its arguments (i.e., 
) at decreasing rates (i.e., 
) and that both leisure and NPE are complements with 
consumption (i.e.,  ).
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5 Additionally, although not essential to our analysis, 
we assume that  , implying that leisure and NPE are complements in the 
individual’s preferences: the greater the non-pecuniary effects of one’s employment the 
better one would appreciate additional leisure time. Of course, one can think of some 
extreme preferences, such as those of either ‘isolationist” or “community devout” 
persons, for which leisure and NPE can be substitutes.  
0 zm U ≥
 Let   be the individual’s maximum available time, so that . Then, 
we can rewriteU in the reduced form of   
0 T ≥ zT =− A
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The overall, or net, marginal utility of labor time is 
 
 //zm ud U d U U m ′ ∂∂ = = −+ AA A
                                                
      (3.2) 
 
where the first term on the right-hand side is the marginal disutility of labor and 
the second term is the marginal utility of labor that arises from the non- pecuniary value 
 
4 Beyond the assumption that , it is difficult to be sure about the curvature of this function, 
although it seems plausible to assume that beyond certain level, the marginal value of NPE 
declines as labor time increases, i.e., that  becomes an increasing concave function. 
()0 m′ > A
() m A
5 Wherever no confusion arises, a subscript under a variable denotes partial derivatives. Also, 
unless stated otherwise, throughout the paper we assume that all functions are at least twice 
continuously differentiable. 
  3of employment. It seems plausible to think that, at any given consumption levelc, for 
sufficiently large values ofAthe first term dominates the second one (implying that at the 
margin labor becomes a net source of disutility,  ( , ) / 0 uc u ≡ ∂∂ < A AA ) and vice versa for 
sufficiently small values ofA. So, we assume: 
(A1): For  each  , there exists a uniqueˆ such that   0 c > () 0 c > A
 
   (,) / () 0 zm uc U U m ′ ∂∂ = − + AA A =   and   (3.3) 
>
< A AA A
<
ˆ (, ) 0  i f   () > uc c
That is, ˆ is the threshold labor time, at consumption level , so that the marginal 
disutility of labor exactly offsets its marginal utility?  In Figure 1, ˆ  is shown by the 
dashed curved. Furthermore, we assume that: 
() c A c
() c A
(A2):   ˆ is decreasing. () c A
6  
This assumption implies that the richer is a household the lower is the threshold 
labor time where labor becomes a net source of disutility. This seems quite plausible; the 
higher the living standard of a household the more distasteful become the additional 
working hours (the larger the marginal disutility of work) and therefore the smaller will 
be the critical working time . It can be shown that if u is strictly quasi-concave, then 
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              (3.4) 
so that (A2) boils down to assuming that as consumption rises the marginal value of 
leisure (or the marginal disutility of work) increases by a greater amount than does the 
 
6 An example of a utility function satisfying (A1) and (A2) is 
  η η πη η =+ − < > A AA A A ( , ) (1 ),  0< < 1,  0. c uc c c c π  
Also, it is easy to show that this function is strictly quasi-concave. 
 
7 To see this, totally differentiate  = A A ˆ [,() ]0 uc c to have . On the other 
hand,  is strictly quasi-concave and thus,
=− AA AA A ˆˆ () / [,() ] / [,() ] dc d c u c c u c c c A ˆ
u − + AA A A A
22 2[ ( ) ( ) uuu u u u u cc c c c> ] 0 , which upon substituting 
 yields  . That is,  = A A ˆ [,() ]0 uc c 2 ()0 uu c < AA < A AA ˆ [,() ]0 ucc . Thus, 
  =− < ⇔ < AA A A AA A A ˆˆ ˆ ˆ () / [,() ] / [,() ]0 [,() ]0 . d c d cuccucc ucc cc
  4marginal non-pecuniary value of work. Noting from (3.3) that at along the ˆ locus, one 
has , condition (3.4) can be rewritten as   
() c A
( ) / z ml U U ′ = m
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cU U
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That is, for ˆ  to be decreasing inc, at the critical level of labor, the elasticity of 
marginal value of leisure with respect to consumption (the second-term in the bracket) 
should exceed that of the non-pecuniary effects (the first term in the bracket).  Figure 1 
depicts the indifference curves associated with the utility function  under 





( , ) 0 uc < A A , indicating that the marginal utility of leisure is 
greater than that of the non-pecuniary effects. The exact opposite is true everywhere 
below the curve ofˆ . () c A
8  
Now, consider an individual’s decision problem. Let   be the given wage 
rate in terms of the consumption good whose price is normalized to be
0 w>
1 p = . Then the 
problem is 





, max ( , )





The Lagrangian is  (,) ( ) ( ) uc w c T µ ν + −+ − AA A , whereµ  and ν  are the Lagrange 
multipliers. Given our assumption that  , implying , and 
hence , the necessary conditions for optimal(* are 
as 0 c uc →∞ →
* 0 c >
* 0 > A ,* ) c A
 
                                                 
8  As depicted in Figure 1, it seems plausible to assume that no matter how high one’s 
consumption level, some amount of time allocated to work is always desirable (i.e., 




AA ) and that at the subsistence level of living ( c ) the marginal value of leisure tends to  
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  For the optimal(* , we have the following three cases:  ,* ) c A
  
 Case  (1):  0 ν =  so that  < A*   T and  < A A (* ,* ) 0 , uc  
 Case  (2):  0 ν >  so that = A* T , and  ≤ A A (* ,* ) 0 , uc  
 Case  (3):  0 ν >  so that = A* T , and .  > A A (* ,* ) 0 uc
 
Cases (1) and (2) correspond to the assumption of the standard model of labor-
leisure choice, where labor is regarded only as a source of disutility. By contrast, labor is 
a source of utility in Case (3), which is the case of interest to us. Figure 1 depicts the 
three cases. As shown there, there is a critical wage rate   such that Case (3) 
holds if .  We thus can state the following proposition: 
1 ˆ ˆ () / wT
− ≡ A T
≤ ˆ ww
 
Proposition 1: Once the standard theory is extended to include the non-pecuniary effects 
of employment in the individual’s utility function, then at very low wage rates 
employment becomes a net source of utility, inducing the individual to supply labor to the 
extent feasible.  
Proposition 1 implies a supply curve that differs significantly from the one 
derived under the usual assumptions from the standard theory: whereas in the traditional 
model, the labor supply curve first rises with the wage rate,   here it begins with a vertical 
section at  (completely inelastic labor supply) at wage rates below , although, as is 
well known, for  the labor supply curve could take various shapes including 
backward ending.    
T = A ˆ w
ˆ ww >
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  Figure 1. Preferences with non-pecuniary effects of employment 
 
Two further questions of interest are: First, how is the individual’s labor supply 
affected by the extent of the NPE an individual derives from employment? Specifically, 
does a greater NPE imply a greater individual labor supply? Second, as a special 
interesting case of the this question, would labor supply always be greater if the 
individual derives positive NPE from work than if, as assumed in the standard theory, she 
does not?  To answer these questions, let, as before,   capture all the NPE as a 
function of time worked, where it is assumed that 
() ml
() 0 ml ′ >  and  () 0 ml ′′ ≤ .  The extent to 
which the individual considers these effects is indicated by the parameter [0,1] α ∈ . Thus, 
0 α =  if, as assumed in the standard theory, the individual does not consider the NPE of 
her working time, and  1 α =  if she fully takes these effects into account.  More generally, 
let  () nm l α = be the extent to which the individual accounts for the NPE, and 
be her utility function, which she maximizes subject to the time and budget 
constraints given in (3.5).  Denoting the value function by 
, the FOC for an interior optimum is  
(,,) Uczn
* (,) m a x ( , , ( ) ) vl Uw lT l ml α ≡− α
* =        (3.7) 
* (,) / () 0 czn vl l w U U U m l αα ′ ∂∂ = − +
  7where for notational convenience the arguments of the utility function 
( ,, cw l zTl n m l ( ) α == − = ) are suppressed.   
  Equation (3.7) is solved implicitly for the optimum labor supply
*() l α as a 
function ofα .So, by differentiating (3.7) implicitly with respect toα  and collecting 
terms, we obtain  
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Where  and 
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 is generally ambiguous. 
  However, when the utility function is additive separable inn, 
implying , we have  0 cn zn UU ==
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where  is the elasticity of marginal utility of NPE.   
n U Ε
  Thus, by (3.9), the answer to the first question posed above can be stated as 
 
Proposition 2: If, but not only if, the individual preferences are additive separable in 
non-pecuniary effects of employment, then the greater the non-pecuniary effects (i.e. the 
largerα ) the greater will be the individual’s labor supply provided that the elasticity of 
the marginal utility of NPE is less than one.
9  
                                                 
9 While we have focused on the positive non-pecuniary effects of employment, it should be clear 
that the reverse of the result furnished in Proposition 2 holds when the individual associates 
negative non-pecuniary effects with work, thus inflicting disutility.  
  8  The additively separable preferences in Proposition 2 can generally take the form 
of , where is the standard utility function where 
utility depends only on consumption and leisure, and  denotes the utility from NPE 
of employment. This has a number of interesting implications. For example, as can be 
seen from (3.9), when , that is, the utility of the non-pecuniary effects the 
individual derives from work is simply a flat amount and hence invariant with hours of 
work, the individual’s labor supply is not affected by the NPE, and is determined 
according to the standard theory.   It is also clear that if the utility of NPE increases 
linearly with hours of work, i.e.
( , , ) ( , ) ( )





N Un B =
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N Un n β = ,  0 β > , then  0
n U Ε = for all , so that, 
by (3.9), the individual will supply more labor than she would in the absence of NPE. 
0 n >
  Furthermore, to answer the second question posed above, we note that for the 
special case when the individual does not take any of the NPE of her employment into 


















. Thus,  
Corollary:  When preferences are additive separable in non-pecuniary effects of 
employment, the individual’s labor supply will be greater when she takes the non-
pecuniary effects into account (0 ) α > than when, as assumed in the standard theory, she 
does not ( 0 α = ).  
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
Once the standard theory of individual labor supply is extended to allow for 
socio-psychological (non-pecuniary) value of work, very poor individuals may choose to 
work at a maximum feasible level. This result may help to explain why it is difficult to 
downsize labor even when attractive unemployment (or retirement) benefits are available. 
It may also explain why in poor rural communities that depend crucially on a natural 
resource for their livings there may be too much effort spent on extracting the resource, 
thus leading to its exhaustion in a finite time. We have also shown the conditions under 
which a greater non-pecuniary effect of employment leads to a larger individual labor 
supply. 
  9 The simple theoretical model of this paper can be extended in several interesting 
ways. For example, one can investigate how the individual’s labor supply decision would 
be affected by allowing, for example, for individual’s non-wage income (wealth) in 
addition to wage income, or for other sources of non-pecuniary benefits than employment 
(for example, charitable donations or voluntary work), or for uncertainty about the wage 
rate.  It would also be interesting to conduct empirical studies to test whether the non-
pecuniary effects of employment is stronger among rural community workers than among 
urban industrial ones, and how it may be affected by idiosyncratic factors such as 
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